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Abortion
The June 30, 1967 issue of Commonweal presents a symposium of four articles on the issue of abortion reform
in the United States.
In the first of these articles, The Dangerous Assumptions, Richard John Neuhaus attempts to expose "five pollutants"
which have prevented adequate discussion
of the question, especially in New York.
The first pollutant, he alleges, is the
hypocrisy of the Roman Catholic Bishops
.indicated by their stand against abortion
on the basis of human rights, contrasted
with their "sublime indifference to the
slaughter of the innocents in Vietnam."
This dichotomy causes a distrust of the
Bishops' position on abortion. Mr. Neuhaus feels that this can only be overcome
by dialogue outside the public arena and
below the level of official comments.
The second factor hindering discussion
is the attack on the motives of each side
rather than emphasis being placed on
the substantive issues. Thus, opponents
of abortion liberalization often correlate
support of abortion with genocide, while
supporters of liberalization accuse opponents of maintaining a nineteenth-century
mentality and a desire to inflict mental
and physical punishment upon women.
Any discussion of a question as import-

ant as this clearly must proceed on an
assumption of good faith on the part of
both parties without any attempt to impugn the motives of the participants.
A further obstacle to the discussion of
the issue is the attempt by many people
to force the participants into neat categories. The most familiar of these categorizations is that Catholics are in opposition to reform, while Protestants and
Jews are in favor. Advocates of such
forced categorizing find support for their
argument in the recent legislative conflicts in Colorado and New York. The
success of the Colorado liberalization legislation has been attributed to the low
percentage of Catholics in the population;
the failure of the New York legislation
has been tied to the opposition of the
Catholics, despite the general support of
the Protestant and Jewish populations.
It is Mr. Neuhaus' view that the question of abortion reform is one which can
be based on points of reference common
to all the population without regard to
religious beliefs.
The fourth pollutant Mr. Neuhaus seeks
to filter from the atmosphere of discussion is the attempt by many advocates of
reform to advance the notion that abortion and contraception are two parts of
one question and that a person's attitude
toward each should be the same. It is
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Mr. Neuhaus' contention that the opponents of abortion derive their arguments
not from Church law, as are the arguments against contraception, but "from a
conviction regarding the prudent and just
course for the whole of society."
The last, but surely not the least,
hindrance to the discussions is a lack of
candor on the part of advocates of such
legislation as the Blumenthal Bill. Mr.
Neuhaus feels that it is fairly obvious that
the reforms currently in question are
only the beginning steps in the liberalization movement. Supporters of these bills
should state their ultimate goal in order
to permit more effective debate on the
question.
The solution to the abortion problem
can only be reached by an investigation
of the question "what is man?" The answer can only be found through the use
of the full resources of biology, law, philosophy and theology, and cannot be avoided
by attempts to find an "obvious" distinction between a fetus and a child or
by an attempt to shift the emphasis to
the mental health of the mother.
It is Mr. Neuhaus' opinion that the
avoidance of pain to the mother is not a
strong argument when balanced against
the taking of a human life. Thus, for
those who support the view that abortion
is the taking of human life, any mental
suffering to the mother as a result of
pregnancy would only justify an abortion
if it were sufficient to justify killing in
self-defense.
It is Mr. Neuhaus' conclusion that
"contemporary understanding" of the continuing process of life precludes the exclusion of a pre-natal child from our concept of man and that the degree of flex-

ibility we will permit in regard to abortion
is directly tied to the question of our
flexibility in the taking of human life.
Mr. Neuhaus suggests that more positive remedies to the problem of unwanted
births are available through birth control
and family planning rather than through
the route of abortion liberalization-a
path which may lead to more evils than
it will correct.
In the second article in the symposium,
A Morality of Consequences, Julian Pleasants contends that Catholicism's traditional anti-abortion stand is the result of
either an inadequate understanding of the
medical procedure or the application of
norms of conduct inconsistent with those
used in other circumstances.
The death of the child results not from
the medical procedure of abortion but
from the fact that the state of medical
technology is not sufficiently advanced to
support children whose body systems are
not sufficiently developed to sustain extra-uterine existence. The normal medical procedure for terminating pregnancy
in the middle months of pregnancy is
basically the same as that used in the
final three months. Thus, it is the same
as the methods used to save the unborn
child from dangers of the womb. The
medical process, therefore, is a procedure
which is not bad in itself. If this inadequate knowledge is the basis of Catholicism's objections to abortion, indications are that advances in medical technology will soon permit the duplication
of womb conditions in a manner sufficient to support underdeveloped babies.
Mr. Pleasants supports his contention that
it is not the act but the consequences
which are bad by pointing out that.,a
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mother cannot terminate a pregnancy in
the early stages because of imminent kidney failure but may do so in the eighth
month of pregnancy if she has kidney
problems.
It seems then that the objection to
abortion is based on the application of
norms of conduct different from those applied in other situations. The right of
a child to life can only be given meaning
by the existence of a corresponding obligation on the part of others to maintain that
life.
The mother is the only one who can
keep the child alive in the early stages of
pregnancy, and, thus, any obligation to
maintain the child's life must be placed
on her.
In the case of a woman who has been
raped, it is highly possible that the continuation of the pregnancy will cause her
mental anguish and physical inconvenience. In such a case, the Church places
an absolute value on the life of the child.
Yet, Mr. Pleasants contends, other members of the Church do not accept great,
or even minor inconvenience to save the
lives of people around the world who are
dying of starvation and disease.
It is Mr. Pleasants' opinion that the
Church must reevaluate its condemnation
of therapeutic abortion and abortions in
the case of rape.
The present clamor for liberalized
abortion laws seeks even greater freedom
since it seeks to allow a woman to obtain
an abortion when her health is threatened
by the continuance of the pregnancy.
Since Catholics maintain that there is a
point beyond which they need not sacrifice their values to save the life of an-
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other, a balance must be reached between
the death of the unborn child and the
temporary, or perhaps permanent, loss
of the mother's health.
Furthermore,
Catholics must ask themselves how nonCatholics see this balance in order to determine what demands a pluralistic society may place on the mother to maintain the life of the baby. Proper consideration must be given to the fact that
many people place great emphasis on the
possibility that a mother's incapacity may
cause great burdens to be placed on the
other members of the family. In some
cases these burdens may be as great as
they could be if the mother had died.
Catholics, of course, deem death to be
of much more consequence since man's
goal on earth is the attainment of eternal
salvation and one's journey toward that
goal should, not -be-cut. short.
In addition, there seem to be, in Mr.
Pleasants' opinion, two different views as
to the evil which results from the child's
death. Catholics consider the death to
result in the destruction of the future
while others often consider it to be the
destruction of the past and the loss of
an "investment" for the future.
The
closer to conception that the "loss of the
investment" occurs, the less that is lost.
Mr. Pleasants feels that eventually the
point is reached where the loss of the
investment is balanced against the loss
which would occur if the mother becomes
incapacitated.
Mr. Pleasants concludes that if laws
become so lax that abortion becomes a
means of getting rid of an unwanted child,
those laws would constitute a threat to
the basis of our society. The end result
would be a judging of a person's right to
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life by the inconvenience caused to another.
In Questions about Questions, Thomas
Wassmer, S.J., attempts to shed light on
a problem which has long been a point
of conflict among Catholic scholars. This
dispute centers around the question
whether a human being comes into existence at the moment of conception (immediate animation) or at some point later
in the pregnancy (mediate animation).
Father Wassmer presents some interesting
arguments to support the movement of a
great number of scholars in the direction
of the theory of mediate animation.
Certain physiological facts cast doubt
on the existence of a rational soul at the
moment of conception. At that time the
human body, as such, does not exist, but
rather there is an accumulation of cells
with the potential of becoming a human
being. Father Wassmer finds even stronger force to support the mediate animation theory in the phenomenon of identical twins. The fact that one zygote
splits and develops into two human beings casts serious doubt on the idea that
a human being exists at the moment of
conception. Father Wassmer asks: "How
can a human being, one for the shortest
span of time, become two by reason of
this separation?"
Furthermore, Father
Wassmer states that the spirituality of the
soul should destroy any idea of its being
divisible.
According to Father Wassmer, there
are other theological problems one must
overcome when he advocates the theory
of immediate animation. Specifically there
is the concept that when a doubt of fact,
involving life, exists, the safer course of
conduct must be followed. In the dis-

cussion of the abortion question, doubt
of fact as to the moment of conception
exists, and, therefore, the theory of immediate animation, being the safer course,
should be followed. However, it is Father Wassmer's contention that there are
situations in which moralists have abandoned the safer course of conduct even
where a doubt of fact exists.
He cites two specific examples to support his contention. First, in the case
of rape, moralists permit the use of a
douche as late as ten hours after the assault. This is justified on the ground
that conception has been known to take
place within that time period but the
exact moment of conception is not determinable. But, clearly, the safer course
would be to consider impregnation and
conception as having occurred at the
earliest possible moment after the assault,
perhaps even at the moment of the assault.
Secondly, in the case of terminal illness, where, after the use of all ordinary
means, there is no probability that the
patient will return to rational consciousness, moralists generally justify the voluntary decision not to use extraordinary
means to continue the patient's life. In
such cases, there is a doubt of fact as to
the ability of the patient to reattain consciousness and yet the safer course-the
use of extraordinary means-is not demanded.
The author concludes that Catholic
moralists have not reached the absolute
position that where there is some question
as to the existence of life, other values
do not allow its forfeiture and that apparently, some further investigation is
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needed into the Church's position on
abortion.
The final article in the symposium, Law
and the Common Good, investigates the
question of liberalized abortion laws from
the viewpoint of a physician, Andre E.
Hellegers, M.D.
It is Dr. Hellegers' prime contention
that the responsibility for governing abortion should be left in the hands of the
legal profession and not placed upon the
shoulders of the physician who would be
subject to the pressures of the patientdoctor relationship. Thus, although many
therapeutic abortions are presently performed in the absence of a direct threat
to the mother's life, Dr. Hellegers seems
to indicate that the law should not be revised to follow present medical practice.
Rather, he seems to feel that present
law should be interpreted with greater
liberality.
He illustrates his position by an analysis
of Section 230.3 of the Model Penal Code
of the American Law Institute, which
permits an abortion when the circumstances are such that two physicians (one
of whom may be the physician performing
the abortion) believe that justifying circumstances exist. As Dr. Hellegers points
out, there is no requirement that the
doctors' belief be reasonable or that either
of them be an expert or that the cirBasing his
cumstances actually exist.
opinion on the fact that 27.9 per cent of
the convictions for criminal abortions in
New York are against licensed physicians,
Dr. Hellegers fears that the beliefs of too
many physicians will be affected by the
presence of money.
Dr. Hellegers further insists that maternal life, health and mental health are
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decreasingly compelling reasons for justification of abortion. There are relatively
few reasons, he concludes, which presently
exist for permitting abortions. One of
these is an indication that the fetus has
been damaged in some way, e.g., when
the mother has contracted German Measles
Dr. Hellegers feels
during pregnancy.
that many causes of damage to the fetus
will disappear as medical techniques adFurthermore, he contends that
vance.
abortion, in such cases, is really for the
benefit of the parents who do not want
to take the risk of having an abnormal
child, but such abortions are in total
disregard of the rights and desire of the
child who has not been consulted in the
matter and who therefore has had no
opportunity to express his views on his
desire to live.
In instances of rape and incest, the
emphasis is solely on the mental health
of the mother and no considerations of
physical health or maternal life enter the
picture. There is no indication of fetal
damage to support the idea of abortion.
Dr. Hellegers suggests that the mental
strain on the mother, if it is to be a
ground for abortion, should at least have
some outward manifestation. The minimum indication could be consultation with
a physician within five days of the rape
to permit uterine curettage-a procedure
which is presently legal and safer than
abortion. Additionally, such a treatment
would alleviate any psychological strain
the victim might suffer as a result of fearing an unwanted pregnancy by the rapist.
Dr. Hellegers feels this would also aid the
prosecution of rapists since charges would
be pressed at an early stage.
Dr. Hellegers attacks the contention
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that the number of illegal abortions in the
United States results in many thousands
of deaths of mothers. He contends that
the figures which serve as the basis for
the claims do not rest on true cross sections of the population and were generally
taken prior to 1935, a period in which
antibiotics were unknown. Dr. Hellegers
estimates that the true figure for maternal
deaths would be less than one-tenth that
claimed by supporters of liberalized abortion legislation.
The examples set by other countries in
which abortion laws have been liberalized
present a somewhat gloomy precedent for
liberalization in the United States primarily because such liberalization has not
tended to decrease illegal abortions. Furthermore, if the figures from these countries are projected in the United States,
there would be between one and three
million abortions each year.
Dr. Hellegers contends that liberalization of abortion will result in its use as
a birth control measure since it will become easier to terminate the pregnancy
than to maintain the "constant motivation"
necessary to avoid conception.
Despite great advances made by the
law in protecting such rights of the unborn as the right to inheritance, Dr. Hellegers feels that more liberal abortion laws
may result in depriving the unborn of its
primary right-the right to life.
Although all four authors generally are
opposed to broad liberalization of abortion
laws, some interesting questions are raised
concerning the Catholic Church's absolute
position against abortion. Especially interesting to Catholics are the, comments
by Father Wassmer on the theory of
mediate animation. If that theory is ac-

cepted, then there would seem to be little
to support the contention that abortion
before animation is the taking of a human
life.
Thus, it would seem that the
Church's position on therapeutic abortions
and abortions when the mother's health is
seriously endangered would be subject to
reinvestigation.
These four articles are a stimulating
and welcome addition to the continuing
dialogue on a question of primary importance and concern to the public-atlarge and interested Catholic laymen.
Contraception
A recent edition of Catholic Mind
(June 1967) presents an article by John
T. Noonan, Jr., in which he examines the
teachings of the Church concerning usury
and contraception in an attempt to demonstrate that there is a rather strong basis
for the position that the possibility of a
change in those teachings on contraception
is not foreclosed.
Mr. Noonan first presents the development of the absolute prohibition of usury
in the writings of Sts. Ambrose, Jerome
and Augustine and indicates that the term
was explicitly meant to include "whatever is demanded beyond the principal."
The prohibition was grounded upon Old
Testament texts and their explicit confirmation in the New Testament. In contrast, he points out that the chief reliance
for support of the prohibition of all forms
of contraception is the Genesis story of
Onan, which the author contends should
be read in the context of Mosaic Law in
general and, if this is done, he contends
that the conclusion that it does not support a general prohibition of contraception
is at least as plausible as the opposite con-
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clusion. His position is that, in comparison, the Scriptural support for the
prohibition of contraception is far less
weighty than that supporting the position
on usury. In addition, Mr. Noonan points
to the continuing vitality of the usury
condemnation through the patristic writings of Ambrose, Augustine and the Greek
Fathers and contrasts this with the less
explicit and more diverse positions on
contraception. So, too, the authority of
the Councils (Lateran I and I and
Vienne) was explicitly applied to the
support of the usury law to the extent that
their declarations were proximate to making the prohibition of usury a matter of
faith. Again, in contrast, such conciliar
weight, according to Mr. Noonan, has never
been given to the contraception ban since
no general council has ever taken an explicit position on the question and the
only comparable support is to be found
in scattered pronouncements by local
synods.
Still another contrast is presented in
the differences in number and authoritative
weight of papal declarations on these matters. Mr. Noouan points to several papal
statements on usury which were based upon
scriptural commands and therefore, even
if short of infallible, at least carried a
high degree of authority. The author
contends that papal statements on contraception are of a less authoritative character since they apparently constitute a
reaffirmation of the patristic position and
therefore carry little or no additional
weight. He further contends that the
strongest papal teaching on contraception,
contained in Pius XI's Casti connubii,
must be read as qualified by the later
statements of Pius XII and Paul VI, the
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first recognizing the principle of regulation
through the use of rhythm and the second
implying that statements made by Pius
XII were not unchangeable. The conclusion drawn is that papal authority on
contraception is no stronger than was
papal authority on usury in 1450 and
that, therefore, the changes made in the
latter may present a basis for bringing
about changes in the former.
To provide this basis for possible
change, Mr. Noonan propounds three
views which have been taken of the authority behind the condemnation of usury:
that such teaching was an irrevocable
commitment by the Church through its
infallible teaching and that its change refutes the claim to infallibility; that the
teaching was not as absolute as it appeared because it was limited by its partial non-acceptance by the laity most
affected by it, but this would make morality dependent on democratic acceptance;
or, finally, that the authority of the rule
should be evaluated in terms of its purpose and the context within which it was
found necessary to promulgate it. In this
light, the rigidity of the usury prohibition
must be seen in the light of the simple
agrarian economy to which it was applied
and in that context it served the purpose
of "justice and charity." The author then
suggests the proposition that specific moral
rules enacted by the Church may be taken
as sure guides for the periods for which
they are enacted, but that they are not
beyond re-examination and revision to
preserve their purpose and to protect the
permanent goods they safeguard.
Justice and charity remain the concern
of the Church but the question of what
acts are just depends on the concrete cir-
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cumstances of a society. In the same
light, Mr. Noonan proposes that the
contraception question be re-examined in
light of its purposes and the concrete
present social conditions upon which it
seeks to operate. The goods sought by
the prohibition are summarized in four
propositions: procreation is good; innocent life may never be attacked; the personal dignity of a spouse must be respected by the other spouse; and, sexual
love is holy in marriage. The author contends that the prohibition was necessary
in circumstances in which each of these
goods was under direct attack, i.e., the
value of procreation was attacked, embryonic life was held cheap, freedom in
the choice of a spouse was limited and
the danger of exploitation of the woman
was high.
In such circumstances, the
contraception ban was a necessary moral
guide. The contention presented is that,
if these goods can under modern conditions be protected without an absolute
ban, then a revision of that ban would
seem permissible and desirable.
The
author's position is that none of the above
challenges are currently seriously involved and that, therefore, the absolute
ban may be relaxed.
Mr. Noonan presents an interesting analogy and the conclusion is at least initially persuasive. If, in fact, the position
of the Church on contraception was formulated to respond to particular circumstances, it seems quite logical to conclude
that the position can and should be revised when those particular circumstances
change. But the point needs to be made
that the revision, if any, must depend on
what the particular circumstances have
now become, i.e., have conditions merely

changed or have they changed positively
so that the ban might prudently be relaxed? This is perhaps the key to the
discussion presented in the article: the
author shows that the specific conditions
which initially justified the absolute ban
are no longer present, but does not present any discussion of what present circumstances are, so that a judgment can
be made as to whether they are sufficiently
different as to justify a revision or whether
the present circumstances, though different, are still such as to require the retention of the current position on contraception. The analogy to usury is interesting, but could be made more persuasive by a showing of a change in controlling circumstances warranting a revision on the contraception question similar to that which was made on the usury
question. For a book-length treatment of
the question, interested readers should
refer to Mr. Noonan's Contraception: A
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic
Theologians and Canonists (1965).
The New Legality
A new concept of law, emanating from
the holdings of the United States Supreme
Court, has developed in the United States.
Although it has been characterized in
many ways, including the "rule of men,"
Mr. Hugo A. Touchy, in the June 1967
American Bar Association Journal, has
styled it "The New Legality."
Adopting the thesis that man is more
important than the law, the "new legality"
advocates the overturning of precedent as
soon as it is recognized to be in error.
The "old legality," by contrast, held to
the concept that the law, as set out by
the legislature, was final. The holdings
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of the highest state tribunals and the Supreme Court were to be followed in order
to provide consistency in the law. Any
necessary changes in the law were to be
derived from the legislature; the courts in
the face of an unjust result "would dutifully mention that its hands were tied and
that changes must come from the lawmakers or the people."
The "new legality" approaches cases
with the idea of protecting the parties'
rights and freedoms against any danger,
even if that danger is the written law.
It does this without any attempt to pay
lip service to the following of precedent.
The feeling that adherence to precedent has, in the past, resulted in injustices,
has led to this new concept of the Court
accepting the burden of correcting unfair results and not passing the problem
to the legislatures.
This new trend in the Court is not
without its critics. Mr. Justice Black
has expressed the feeling that the concept is a means of making substantive
constitutional changes at the whim of a
majority of the Court. He fears that the
''new legality" will permit the Court to
become too concerned with the problems
of policy and morals.
Mr. Touchy feels that this new concept of court decisions has not reached an
end. In his opinion the trial courts must
begin to decide cases on the principles of
the "new legality" so as to avoid unjust
decisions which will later be reversed by
appellate courts.
This new concept of legality, carried to
its fullest extreme, renders the doctrine
of stare decisis a nullity. The Supreme
Court appears to be on a course of abandonment of its established case law in
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favor of approaching each case on its
merits. Although the application of justice
by the Court in each case is preferable to
blind adherence to precedent, the Court
should avoid setting itself up as a superlegislature, establishing rules of law according to its own feelings of the public
policy and moral standards of the country.
The use of the "new legality" by all
courts would result in a total abandonment of the judicial role of applying the
law rather than making it.
Law and Order
The February 1967 issue of the New
York State Bar Journal presents an interesting discussion of the problem of the
decline in respect for law and order, from
the viewpoint of a Canadian lawyer,
Judge J. C. McRuer.
Premising his comments on the philosophies of men such as Pound, Pollack
and Goodhart that law is not based on
force but on moral obligation and human
rights, the author states that "law as distinguished from laws calls for justice."
The man of today, living in a better
educated society in which democratic institutions have made great advances, will
not accept authority which is not accompanied by a sense of obligation. "Even
a demand for passive surrender to the
power of the majority is not accepted by
people of intellect today." It is Judge
McRuer's opinion that laws which are
merely the will of the majority imposed
on others through enforcement agencies
are not law.
Judge McRuer's contention is that
present-day discontent has resulted from
a growing realization of the social injustice
of many laws and customs.
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According to Judge McRuer, law and
governmental processes have not developed
in tune with man's increasing awareness,
in the last fifty years, of the "self-evident"
statements of truth expressed in such
documents as the Declaration of Independence. Men are readily aware of unjust laws and although these laws may be
obeyed, they will not be respected.
Judge McRuer feels that the so-called
"disrespect for law" may really be the
outward expression of the new social order
and inward desires for justice motivated
by changing concepts of social justice
which have generated disrespect for the
old order. Disrespect for an order not
deserving of respect is considered by
Judge McRuer to be a healthy reaction
by citizens.
Justice is no less respected by the average citizen today, contends Judge McRuer,
Rather,
than it was fifty years ago.
modern communication methods cause
the administrators of justice to operate
in view of the public, clearly pointing out
injustices in the laws, the revelation of
which brings about the social discontent
which is often interpreted as disrespect
for law.
It is Judge McRuer's conclusion that
there is no decline in respect for law,
but that it is clearly a decline in respect for
laws which has resulted from the failure of
legislators, lawyers and judges to develop
just laws and procedures appropriate to
social changes.
The remedy, he contends, is to investigate the laws and the procedures by
which the authority of the law is made
known in the light of the Declaration of
Independence to determine their justness.
Study of procedure is necessary since

"the protection of the rights of the individual human being is not so much the
law but the procedure by which it is administered."
It is Judge McRuer's final contention
that the concept of rules of law and
order must extend to the international
sphere since the young people do not accept law and order within their own country while governments acknowledge no
law and order in their dealings with other
nations.
Equal Protection
The protection of the rights of illegitimate children has long been a matter of
concern to the legal profession. Much
discrimination, social and legal, has been
practiced against these members of society. The author of an article in a recent issue of the Michigan Law Review
(January 1967) contends that any legal
discrimination is unjustified and should be
eliminated through the use of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Contending that the "state action"
necessary to show a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is found by virtue
of legislation denying such rights as intestacy rights, support and welfare to illegitimates, he investigates the alleged reasons
used to justify such discriminatory legislation.
Suggesting that the law has traditionally
approached the problem from the viewpoint of the parents and society, the author
contends that it should be studied from
Thus, the
the child's point of view.
author finds and rejects five alleged regulatory purposes for legislation which denies
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the illegitimate the rights of the child
born in wedlock.
The idea of such legislation, the author
contends, is primarily to avoid any unjust burden on the alleged father. However, if the identification of the father can
be established with reasonable certainty,
as he contends it can through modem
blood-testing techniques, the reason loses
its justification.
Furthermore, by means of denial of the
child's rights, Mr. Krause suggests, the
state attempts to control the sexual conduct of the parents. It is clear that society's control over relationships it considers illicit should be maintained by a
direct attack on such relationships and
not by punishing the child as the product
of that relationship.
The additional argument is made that
such legislation protects the family unit.
The argument in this respect is twopronged. In the first place, the contention is that granting the illegitimate full
rights will discourage marriage.
The
author's answer, again, is that the state
should take direct steps to discourage
''casual unions" rather than inflicting
punishment on the innocent children.
Secondly, the argument is put forth that
the wife (or husband) should not be
forced to accept the extra-marital child of
the spouse into the family unit due to the
resulting reduction of inheritance. The
author contends that the situation is no
different from the partner accepting the
offspring of a spouse's earlier marriage.
Admitting the possibility of emotional
effect on the wife from accepting such a
child, the author feels it is outweighed by
the psychological harm to the child if he
is forced to be branded a "bastard" by
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society.
Much legislation is justified by the idea
that the father will have a familial relationship with his legitimate offspring which
he lacks with illegitimates. The author
contends that this, being the very wrong
which is complained of, is no justification
at all. In addition, he contends that such
legislation is faulty in that often legitimates
lack such a relationship with the parent
but still enjoy their rights while illegitimates, who do enjoy this relationship, are
still without the rights.
It is unsatisfactory, the author contends, to allow the father to control the
legitimacy of his child only by insisting
on marriage to the mother. Instead, he
suggests that the father should be permitted to legitimatize the child without
marriage.
Having rejected all of these purposes of
discriminatory legislation, the author decides that there were no reasons for such
legislation other than prejudice and selfinterest of the legislators. As Mr. Krause
states:
It was natural that men as legislators,
would have limited their accidental
offsprings' claims against them, both
economically and in terms of a family
relationship, especially since the social status of the illegitimate mother
often did not equal their own. Moreover, their legitimate wives had an
interest in denying the illegitimates
claim on their husbands, since any
such claim could be allowed only at
the expense of the legitimate family.
He further concludes that the limited
rights an illegitimate does have against his
father result from society's attempt to
avoid the support obligation it would
bear if the father did not.
(Continued on page 266)
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for illegitimates is a convincing one. The
child is an unwitting victim of a situation
over which he could exercise no control.
There seems little justification for punishing him for this fact by giving him secondclass legal rights. Although he will never
be free of social stigma, there is no
sound justification for denying him the
legal rights of all citizens.
While Mr.
Krause's explanation of the "real" reason
for discriminatory legislation is somewhat
oversimplified, it seems clear that an illegitimate child's rights outweigh other
considerations for such discriminatory
legislation.

